The federal-state Medicaid program insures 43 million people for virtually all of the prescription drugs approved by the FDA. To determine the price that it will pay for a drug treatment, the government uses the average price in the private sector for that same drug. Assuming that Medicaid recipients are unresponsive to price because of the program's zero co-pay, this rule will increase prices for non-Medicaid consumers. Using drug utilization and expenditure data for the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002, we investigate the relationship between the Medicaid market share (MMS) and the average price of a prescription. Our findings suggest that the Medicaid rules substantially increase equilibrium prices for non-Medicaid consumers. Specifically, a ten percentagepoint increase in the MMS is associated with a ten percent increase in the average price of a prescription. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for a drug's therapeutic class, the existence of generic competition, the number of brand competitors, and the years since the drug entered the market. We also demonstrate that the Medicaid rules increase a firm's incentive to introduce new versions of a drug at higher prices and find empirical evidence in support of this for drugs that do not face generic competition. Taken together, our findings suggest that government procurement can have an important effect on equilibrium prices in the private sector.
I. Introduction
In 2003 the Medicaid program provided health insurance to 43 million low-income people in the U.S. and accounted for $280 billion in federal and state government spending (CMS, 2004) . This program provides coverage for most health care services and Medicaid recipients typically do not share in the cost of their medical care. A large body of previous research has investigated the effect of the Medicaid program on health insurance coverage (Cutler-Gruber, 1996) , health care utilization (Currie-Grogger, 2002) , health outcomes (EpsteinNewhouse, 1998) , labor supply (Yelowitz, 1995) , and savings (Gruber-Yelowitz, 2001) .
1 Taken together the findings from this research suggest that Medicaid provides valuable insurance to low-income individuals but that it introduces significant distortions in medical care purchase decisions, reduces labor supply incentives, and crowds out private insurance coverage.
One issue that has received relatively little attention in previous work is the effect of the Medicaid program on the price of health care treatments. 2 This effect could be important given that Medicaid accounts for 18% of all health care expenditures in the U.S., and the prices the government pays manufacturers are a function of prices paid by non-Medicaid consumers. For example in the case of prescription drugs, Medicaid pays approximately 90% of the average price in the private market (Kaiser, 2002; NASTAD, 2002) . Thus as a firm raises its price to nonMedicaid customers in the U.S. it will receive a higher price for all of Medicaid prescriptions filled. As government purchases become large, it is clear that linking prices in this way could create significant distortions in the private market.
If the absence of a co-pay makes Medicaid recipients relatively unresponsive to price, this reimbursement rule will lead firms to increase pharmaceutical prices for other consumers 1 For an excellent review of this literature see Gruber (2003) . 2 One notable exception is Scott-Morton (1998) in which the author examines the effect of the most-favoredcustomer clause in Medicaid on price dispersion in the non-Medicaid market.
above what they otherwise would be. On the other hand, certain Medicaid regulations attempt to actively steer program participants toward low-cost prescription drugs, suggesting that demand from Medicaid recipients could actually be more responsive to price than is demand from other consumers. Thus both the sign and the magnitude of Medicaid's effect on pharmaceutical prices is ultimately an empirical question.
To investigate this issue, one would ideally exploit sharp and plausibly exogenous changes in the "Medicaid market share" of one or more prescription drugs. One could then test whether prices for non-Medicaid customers were affected, holding constant other characteristics of the drug treatment that might influence equilibrium prices. Unfortunately, no such sharp changes exist, both because the number of Medicaid recipients is relatively stable over time and because the program covers all drugs immediately following their approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Even if these changes did occur, Medicaid constrains its reimbursement rate for any particular treatment to increase no more rapidly than the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Given that we cannot exploit within-drug variation in the Medicaid market share, we therefore exploit variation across drugs. In 2002, Medicaid accounted for 18.5% of the $161 billion in U.S. pharmaceutical spending but this varied substantially across treatments. For example, in 2002 the program accounted for less than 6% of revenues for Lipitor, the top-selling drug in the U.S. In that same year nearly 80% of U.S. revenues for the Zyprexa -the number ten seller overall -came from the Medicaid program. Our key explanatory variable is the Medicaid market share, which is defined as Medicaid revenues in year t divided by total revenues in that same year. We explore the relationship of this variable with pharmaceutical prices while controlling for other observable factors that would influence this outcome variable of interest. In the second main part of our paper, we explore the effect of another potentially important feature of Medicaid that limits price increases for any particular treatment to be no greater than inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. If the optimal price for a drug increases more rapidly than the CPI, this creates the incentive to introduce new versions of a drug with different dosage amounts or route types (e.g. capsule, liquid, tablet). Firms must weigh this incentive against the cost of filing a new drug application (NDA) with the FDA. Our results demonstrate that drugs with high Medicaid revenues introduce more new versions than do other drugs, with this effect much stronger for drugs that do not face generic competition.
Taken together, our results strongly suggest that Medicaid coverage of prescription drugs has increased the price paid by other health care consumers for these same treatments. It is worth noting that government involvement in this segment of the health care sector will soon increase substantially as a result of the Medicare prescription drug benefit, which will subsidize prescription drug costs for the 44 million beneficiaries of this program. Though many details of this drug coverage have not yet been set, our findings for Medicaid suggest that public health insurance can have a substantial effect on pharmaceutical prices. These unintended effects can to some extent offset the benefit to program participants and increase costs for other health care consumers as well. 3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Medicare legislation has already increased pharmaceutical prices (Martinez, 2004) .
More generally, our results suggest that governments face a tradeoff when determining how optimally to set prices for any good or service that they procure. The main benefit of using private sector prices is that governments have a difficult time "getting prices right." But a potentially important cost is the distortion of equilibrium outcomes in the private market, with this effect increasing with the government's share of the market.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Medicaid rules for determining pharmaceutical prices and describes the data used in our empirical
analyses. In section 3 we present an illustrative model of the effect of Medicaid's reimbursement rules on a firm's profit-maximizing price for a prescription drug and on its incentive to introduce new versions of the same drug. Section 4 presents results for the effect of the Medicaid market share on average pharmaceutical prices while section 5 describes our results for the effect on the rate at which new versions of a drug are introduced. The final section concludes and discusses the implications of our results and important directions for future work.
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II. Background and Data
A. Medicaid's Rules for Setting Pharmaceutical Prices
The (Duggan, 2004) .
Each state administers its own Medicaid program though each is subject to a number of federal regulations. In the case of prescription drugs, the federal Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to a large extent sets the price that each state will pay for any of the thousands of drug treatments covered by the program at a point-in-time. There are two steps used to determine the price for a brand name (as opposed to a generic) prescription drug in the first quarter that it is available. First, the state government pays approximately 90% of the product's average wholesale price (AWP) to the pharmacy where the prescription was filled, with this scaling factor varying from a low of 86.5% in Michigan to a high of 95% in Alaska (Kaiser, 2002 Additionally, the program specifies that after a new drug treatment enters the market its Medicaid price cannot increase faster than the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 8 Thus, if a firm's optimal price for a drug is increasing more rapidly than the CPI, a firm attempting to set an optimal price for both its private sales and sales to Medicaid will be constrained. However, the CPI increases apply to changes in price of the same product over time. The level at which a product is defined for purposes of Medicaid rebates is the first nine digits of the national drug code (NDC). An NDC is an eleven-digit code that defines a product perfectly: drug, form, route, and strength. The last two digits determine package size. Medicaid aggregates over package sizes to determine best price and average prices, but the remaining nine 5 While defined as the "average price at which wholesalers sell a given drug to retailers" (NASTAD, 2002) the AWP is perhaps most accurately viewed as its list price and is reported by the pharmaceutical firm to CMS. Recent estimates suggest that it is nearly 20% lower than the actual average price (NHPF, 2002) Averch and Johnson (1962) and later by many others (e.g. Parker, 1999; Borrell, 1999; Olson, 1996) . The distortion of activity by the regulated entity is akin to the theoretical effects found in the principal-agent literature on multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , where the agent's (firm's) measured action responds to incentives but is counteracted by an unmeasured action. 9 Research on the Japanese market for prescription drugs documents frequent product introductions at high prices, and ascribes this behavior to a regulatory regime that allows considerable freedom to the manufacturer in setting the initial price but then imposes steep discounts after launch (Ikegami et al, 1998) .
B. Medicaid and IMS Utilization Data
We merge together data from two main sources. The first source was provided by IMS of the fourteen therapeutic categories and calculate the number of competitors for each drug as equal to the number of other ingredients within its subclass. share increased during our study period to 18.5%.
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We match the Medicaid and IMS data using drug names. 15 Of the thousands of NDCs in each year, fewer than 5% are in our top 200 drugs, though they account for 65% of Medicaid spending in 1997 and almost 70% in 2002. The Medicaid data also includes variables that allow us to determine whether a particular version of a drug is available over-the-counter or if it is generic. As mentioned above, we drop these two types of drugs from our analysis. reported U.S. revenues and we therefore set the Medicaid share equal to 1.00. 18 The variable
Price per Prescription is equal to total Medicaid revenues divided by Medicaid prescriptions in 16 In the IMS data just two Zyprexa products appear. The first, which is simply named Zyprexa, includes the first six regular tables. The second, called Zyprexa Zydis, includes the four dissolvable versions. 17 The ratio for the 5 and 2.5-milligram versions is much lower. This may be because more pills are included in the typical 2.5-milligram prescription. 18 The drug in 1997 is Clozaril and in 2002 is Synagis. Our results are not affected if we exclude these drugs from our subsequent empirical analyses.
each year. To reduce undesirable skewness in this measure we take the log of the price per prescription with the summary statistics for this variable summarized in each table as well.
We would prefer to use the average price of a private-sector U.S. prescription but this information is unfortunately not included in our IMS data. To investigate whether our measure of price is accurate, we compared our estimates of average prescription prices sample. This is perhaps partly because the average number of years that each drug is on 19 Recall that rebates are excluded from our measure of Medicaid revenues. 20 Each ingredient is counted just once and thus the number of versions of a competitor will not influence the value for this variable.
the market falls from 9.1 to 8.2 and thus a smaller fraction of patents would have expired in the more recent sample. In our empirical analyses below we control for these measures of competition along with each drug's major therapeutic category when estimating the influence of the Medicaid market share on pharmaceutical prices and on the rate at which new versions of a drug are introduced.
III. An Illustrative Model
A. Effect of Regulation on prices
Consider a pharmaceutical firm's optimization problem after acquiring FDA approval for a drug. Assume for simplicity that the firm has a patent for the drug, that there is just one period, that there is a constant marginal cost equal to c, and that demand for the drug does not influence the demand for other products produced by this same firm. For simplicity we follow Scott
Morton (1997) and use linear demand bP a Q − = . In the absence of Medicaid, the firm will choose the price of the drug to satisfy the following equation:
where a represents the number of potential customers for the firm and b captures the responsiveness of those consumers to price. Greater values of b imply more elastic demand, which will lower the firm's profit-maximizing price. Now consider a different drug that is otherwise equivalent, but whose customers include m consumers eligible for the Medicaid program. Further suppose that these consumers would not purchase the drug at the profit-maximizing price defined above because they are low-income consumers.
21 Also assume that once enrolled in the program, Medicaid recipients have perfectly inelastic demand for the drug. Since Medicaid recipients typically do not share in the cost of their prescription drugs, it is reasonable to assume that the actual price the firm charges the government does not affect demand in the short run. 22 In the longer run, of course, the Medicaid program could decide not to purchase, or to limit purchases of, certain drugs if they become too expensive. Finally, firms are not permitted to sell only to the Medicaid segment at a price above the maximum reservation price in the non-Medicaid population; they must sell into the private market and charge a uniform price across segments. Given these three assumptions, the demand curve shifts to the right and the relationship between price and quantity on the relevant part of the demand curve is now bP m a Q − + = . As regulation forces the firm to sell to both the private and the Medicaid patients at the same price then the profit-maximizing price is given by:
which is strictly increasing in the number of consumers insured by Medicaid.
Of course Medicaid recipients may not come solely from the low end of the reservation price distribution. But even if one relaxes our earlier assumption, as long as their reservation prices are not solely at the top of this distribution the optimal price will be an increasing function of the Medicaid share. For example if the m Medicaid recipients were just a random subset of potential customers for the firm, then the optimal price would be as follows:
This assumption is more restrictive than is necessary. For example, if the reservation price for each Medicaid recipient is strictly less than the new profit maximizing price of (a + bc + m) / 2b then the demand curve will be as described above. 22 In most states enrollees pay nothing, in others a small fixed co-pay, and in others a small fee (e.g. fifty cents versus one dollar) that varies with the price of the drug (Kaiser, 2002). which is also strictly increasing in m.
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B. Effect of Regulation on New Drug Introductions
As mentioned above, the Medicaid program constrains the rate at which the price of a particular treatment can increase over time to be no greater than inflation as measured by the CPI. If the profit-maximizing price for a drug is increasing more rapidly than this index then a firm could respond by introducing new versions of the same drug and price the new versions higher than the old versions. Of course, in order to place these new products on the market, the firm must receive approval from the FDA. The costs of getting approval for a new version of an existing drug are the fees paid to the FDA, the cost of the clinical trials, and delay. The firm would then optimally weigh these costs against the benefits of unconstrained pricing.
To analyze this issue more formally consider a two-period model in which a firm must decide whether to introduce a new version of a drug at the beginning of period two. Assume that total revenues for the drug in period t are equal to R t (P t ) + MP t and thus that Medicaid demand is unresponsive to price and is constant over time. Assume further that the private revenue function R t (.) shifts so that the optimal unconstrained price for the drug increases from period 1 to period 2 (otherwise the CPI constraint would not bind). And finally, for simplicity we set the discount rate, inflation as measured by the CPI, and the marginal cost of production equal to zero. The firm will then choose P 1 and P 2 to maximize the following profit function:
Here the firm must determine the marginal benefit from introducing the new product at a fixed cost of F. This depends partially on the increase in profit it earns from being able to charge P 2 rather than P 1 to Medicaid recipients in period 2 less the approval costs F. Begin with the naïve assumption that the price in the first period is chosen to be the same regardless of whether or not the firm chooses to introduce a new version. Then the firm will introduce a new version if: represents the optimal price in period t when the firm chooses to introduce a new version at the beginning of period 2 while old t P is equal to the optimal price in period t when it does not. In equation (5) it is easy to see that the increases in Medicaid revenue in period 2 must outweigh the fixed cost of introduction and the loss in private sector revenue from the higher second period price.
24
Now we move to a more general model where the firm's first period price may depend on its introduction strategy. It is straightforward to show that the firm will choose to introduce a new version if and only if: The left-hand side of this equation captures the benefits of introducing a new version while the right-hand side equals the costs. One important benefit is the likely increase in Medicaid revenues resulting from the more flexible pricing. The other is that profits in the first period from private consumers will be higher because the firm gets closer to the value of P 1 that maximizes R 1 (P 1 ) when it does not consider the effect of P 1 on second-period Medicaid revenues. The costs include the fixed costs and the reduction in non-Medicaid revenues in period 2. When the firm introduces a new version, it will select P 2 to maximize R 2 (P 2 ) + MP 2 rather than R 2 (P 2 ), implying that revenues from other consumers will decline. Whether the gain in first-period revenues from non-Medicaid consumers will more than offset the loss in second- 24 Private revenues R 2 (P 2 ) are higher in period two if the firm does not introduce a new version because it would then choose P 2 to maximize R 2 (P 2 ) rather than MP 2 + R 2 (P 2 ). period revenues from these same consumers is theoretically ambiguous. What is clear, however, is that as sales to Medicaid increase the firm will find it more attractive to introduce a new version as the benefits would be more likely to offset the fixed cost. Thus one would expect drugs with high sales to Medicaid -all else equal -to introduce more new versions in response to the program's CPI constraint. We test this along with the effect on pharmaceutical prices in our analyses below.
Before proceeding to this, three additional points are worth noting. First, given its effect on pharmaceutical prices, Medicaid coverage will increase a firm's potential profits for any particular drug and thus could lead to more innovation. 25 Second, any effect of Medicaid on price may influence the behavior of individuals not eligible for Medicaid. For example by exposing them to more medical expenditure risk, individuals may optimally decide to purchase insurance for prescription drugs, which could lead to still further increases in the price of the treatment as average price elasticities decline. 26 And finally, Medicaid coverage is likely to reduce allocative efficiency as some low-valuation, but inelastic, Medicaid consumers end up purchasing the drug while relatively high valuation private consumers may not. We do not explore these issues in our analyses below, though we think that each one represents an important area for future work.
IV. The Effect of Medicaid Market Share on Pharmaceutical Prices
In this section, we investigate the effect of a drug's Medicaid market share on its average price. constrains the rate at which the price for any treatment can increase over time.
We therefore instead exploit the considerable variation across drugs in the Medicaid market share (MMS) to estimate the effect of the program on pharmaceutical prices. As our measure of MMS we take the ratio of Medicaid revenues to total U.S. revenues for that same drug. 27 We control for other factors that are likely to influence the profit-maximizing price for a drug, including the presence of generic competition, the number of drugs within the same subcategory that are available, and the number of years that each drug has been on the market.
The existence of generics introduces substantially more, and different, competition into the market, so we include an indicator of whether or not there is generic competition (GenComp) in the specification. 28 As more therapeutic substitutes (Subst) become available, the drug will face additional competition and its optimal price will decline. Additionally, newer drugs tend to be more expensive than earlier ones -because they embody more new technology -and thus it is important to control for the time (Years) that a drug has been on the market. And finally, we include indicator variables for each of the fourteen major therapeutic categories when estimating 27 This differs from the fraction (m/a) of potential customers from the model above primarily because some nonMedicaid consumers will not buy the drug. 28 The literature is divided on whether generic competition a) lowers the optimal price for a brand-name drug as consumers can easily substitute to a cheaper version, or b) raises the price of the brand as all elastic demanders move to the generic and the remaining customers have inelastic demand Salkever (1997) and (1992) 
In this equation, the dependent variable is equal to the log of the average price for a prescription for drug j in year t. We transform the price variable because its distribution is quite skewed to the right as shown in Table 4 . Even with this transformation the dependent variable remains skewed and thus we use an alternative measure that we describe below.
The coefficient of particular interest in equation (7) is β 1 , which captures the relationship between the Medicaid market share and the average price of a prescription after controlling for several other factors that should exert an effect on the price. In order to assign a causal interpretation to β 1 , two assumptions must hold. First, the Medicaid market share must be orthogonal to unobserved determinants of the price that are not adequately captured in the other explanatory variables. The fact that Medicaid recipients tend to have low incomes suggests that, in the absence of the program, the profit-maximizing price for drugs consumed differentially by them would be lower. This would bias down the OLS estimate for β 1 . Alternatively, if drugs used mainly by Medicaid recipients deliver a greater health benefit than other drugs -and thus would have higher prices in the absence of Medicaid -then the OLS estimate would be biased upwards. One way to gauge the importance of omitted factors is to examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion of alternative control variables which we do below.
The second assumption is that the variation in drug prices does not drive the variation in Medicaid market shares. If, for example, individuals using expensive drugs qualify for Medicaid because of the high drug prices then the estimates for β 1 would be biased as a result of reverse causation. Given that less than 10% of Medicaid recipients qualify for the program because of high medical expenses 29 and given that prescription drugs account for just 12% of all Medicaid spending this seems unlikely to be a significant factor.
In Table 5 we summarize the results of specifications similar to equation (7) In specifications three and four we introduce controls for the number of therapeutic substitutes and the number of years that each drug has been on the market. Each coefficient is, as predicted above, negative, though only the latter variable is statistically significant.
Interestingly, the estimate for the generic competition variable declines in specification four, when we control for the number of years that each drug is on the market, presumably because older drugs are more likely to face generic competition and also tend to have lower prices. Once again the coefficient estimate for β 1 is virtually unchanged. The stability of the estimates for β 1 across specifications strongly suggests that unobservable determinants of price are not driving the estimates. 29 Most instead qualify through a program such as Supplemental Security Income, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or because they are children with family incomes below 185% of the poverty line.
Because of skewness in the distribution of the log of pharmaceutical prices, we next estimate specifications in which we use each drug's rank in the price distribution as the dependent variable. This variable is uniformly distributed from 1 to 200 with the most expensive drug having a value of 200 while the least expensive one has a value equal to one. The results using this alternative measure are summarized in the next panel of Table 5 and are qualitatively similar to those that use the log of price as the dependent variable. Once again the presence of generic competition, the number of therapeutic substitutes, and the age of the drug are all negatively related to price, and in this case all three of these estimates are statistically significant.
Additionally, the estimates for the Medicaid market share are stable across specifications and suggest that drugs purchased differentially by beneficiaries of this program are significantly more expensive. The point estimate in the final specification suggests that a 10-percentage point increase in the Medicaid share is associated with an increase of 5 in that firm's position in the price distribution and this estimate is significant at the one percent level.
In Table 6 we summarize an analogous set of specifications for the top 200 drugs in 2002. The point estimates for the coefficients on the generic competition, the number of therapeutic substitutes, and the age of the drug variables are similar to those obtained using the 1997 sample though the estimated coefficients for the first two variables are not statistically significant in the final specification. Interestingly the implied effect of the Medicaid market share on the log of price and on the rank in the price distribution is substantially greater, suggesting that the effect of Medicaid may be increasing over time. And as before, the estimates for β 1 are quite consistent across specifications as additional explanatory variables are added.
One potentially important issue is the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of drugs with particularly high Medicaid market shares. As recent research has shown (Duggan, 2004) , drugs used to treat antipsychotic illness have the highest Medicaid market shares, with this program accounting for almost 80% of revenues for Zyprexa, Risperdal, Seroquel, Clozaril, and other top-selling antipsychotics. Given that these drugs are substantially more expensive than the average treatment, it is possible that their inclusion in our sample is to some extent driving our results. In a companion set of results not summarized here, we investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to excluding this set of treatments 30 and find that our estimates for β 1 are virtually unchanged. For example the estimate of 0.746 in specification 4 of Table 5 increases to 0.752 when antipsychotic drugs are excluded while the corresponding estimate in Table 6 increases from 1.001 to 1.003. It therefore appears that our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the subclass of drugs with the highest Medicaid market shares.
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Our first set of results strongly suggests that the rules used by the federal government to set prices for prescription drugs have led to an increase in prices faced by other health care
consumers. Given that we are exploiting variation across drugs in the Medicaid market share we cannot rule out the existence of an omitted determinant of pharmaceutical prices that is correlated with the Medicaid share and therefore could be biasing the results. But the fact that our estimates for the Medicaid share are so stable across specifications with alternative control variables suggests that our estimates are reliably capturing the causal effect of interest. 30 This leads us to exclude Zyprexa, Risperdal, Seroquel (2002 only), and Clozaril (1997 only) . The first three were numbers one, two, and four, respectively, in terms of total 2002 Medicaid spending. Recall that we do include fixed effects for therapeutic class, though this groups antipsychotics with other drugs used to treat mental disorders. 31 An additional issue is possible mismeasurement of the Medicaid market share due to missing data on other programs that use Medicaid prices and that have zero or small co-pays. Perhaps the most important one is the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP) which accounted for more than $250 million in HIV antiviral spending in 1997. If we adjust up our Medicaid market shares for the HIV drugs in our sample (from approximately 0.40 to 0.60) to account for the much higher effective shares our results suggest an even larger impact of Medicaid on pharmaceutical prices.
V. The Effect of the Medicaid Market Share on New Drug Introductions
The model presented in section 3 suggested -if the optimal price for a drug is increasing more rapidly than the Consumer Price Index -then a firm has an incentive to avoid Medicaid's CPI constraint by introducing new versions of its drug at a higher price. Of course, in order to place these new products on the market, the firm must receive approval from the FDA. Approval for a new version of an already approved drug either requires a supplemental new drug application (NDA) or a completely new NDA, depending on the significance of the change. show that the effects, or lack thereof, alleged by the applicant are statistically significant.
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Using our Medicaid utilization data, we can determine when new versions of a drug enter the market. For example as described above in the case of Zyprexa, only three versions were released in the drug's first month but seven more were released during the next four years. Of course, even without the CPI constraint the firm may have released new versions of the drug.
32 Average delays for a new NDA are 10 months and for supplemental NDAs are 4-6 months. Fees required by the FDA for either type of application averaged approximately $500,000 during our study period. Informal estimates of the costs of clinical trials range from $500 to $10,000 per patient depending on the length of time required to demonstrate results. For example, a cardiovascular drug would have to be taken longer (several months) than an antibiotic (several days) to demonstrate efficacy.
But in this section we investigate whether drugs that sell differentially to the Medicaid program had more new drug introductions than their counterparts after controlling for other likely determinants of this outcome variable.
A. Are New Versions of Prescription Drugs More Expensive?
We begin by investigating whether new versions of a drug are indeed more expensive than earlier ones. If they are not, then our hypothesis that Medicaid's CPI constraint creates an important distortion may be less plausible as it would then appear that the profit-maximizing price for the drug was not increasing over time. The example of Zyprexa in Table 1 suggested that the most recent versions of this drug were more expensive even after controlling for dosage amount and in Table 7 we investigate whether this is true more generally by estimating specifications of the following type:
In this equation, the unit of observation is the NDC, the outcome variable is the log of the price per prescription, and the variable NotEntrant equals one if an NDC is released after the first year that a drug hits the market and zero otherwise. This specification includes drug fixed effects and therefore estimates the average difference in price between versions of a drug released in the first year that it is available and all later versions of the same drug. We estimate these specifications for NDC's of the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002, with the first sample including 728 observations and the second one including 851.
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The statistically significant estimate of .108 for θ in the first column of Table 7 suggests that newer versions of a drug are approximately 11 percent more expensive than the first version and this result is significant at the ten percent level. We next control with a variable 33 We exclude NDCs for which we do not have an entry date, which is less than 10% of the sample in both years.
YrsSinceEntry, which is equal to the difference between the year that the NDC entered and the first year that the drug was available. The estimate for this coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant. The results for the analogous specification using the 2002 sample of drugs yield slightly smaller estimates for θ, suggesting a 7-9 percent increase in average price from initial to subsequent versions. Thus this is suggestive evidence of the optimal price for a drug increasing over time.
Given that new versions of a drug may -on average -have different dosage amounts than earlier ones, an alternative and perhaps more appropriate measure of a drug's price is the cost per Table 7 suggest that the optimal price for any given drug may be increasing over time, the optimal price for new treatments appears to be increasing even more rapidly.
B. New Drug Introductions
In this section we investigate the effect of a drug's Medicaid market share and its sales to Tables 5 and 6 , we control for two additional variables that are likely to influence the rate at which new versions of a drug are introduced. The first Log(Sales97), is simply equal to the log of total U.S. revenues for the drug in 1997. Because of the fixed costs of new version, as the total revenues for a drug increase the potential gains to releasing new versions will as well. In some specifications we also control for the number of NDCs in 1997 (NumNDC), as this may capture underlying demand and costs for different versions of a drug. But given that the Medicaid share may have influenced this variable as well we estimate specifications both with and without it of the following type: 
In this regression, the variable NewNDC is simply equal to the number of NDCs with more than 0.1% of a drug's sales in 2002 and that had no utilization in 1997. We run Poisson regressions in this case given that the values for this variable are all integers and range from 0 to 6. The first two columns of Table 9 summarize the results from specifications using all 200 drugs from the 1997 sample. In both cases, the estimate for the Log(Sales) coefficient is significantly positive while the coefficient estimate for Years on the market is significantly negative. As predicted, the estimate for the Medicaid share is positive though it is not statistically significant. However in the subsequent two columns we focus on those drugs in our sample that did not face generic competition in 1997. Drugs with generic competition will gain less from introducing new versions of the brand as they face declining sales. Similarly firms producing drugs with Medicaid sales between 100 and 200 million introduce new versions at a 145% higher rate than firms selling drugs with low Medicaid sales and this effect is significant at the ten percent level. This final set of results therefore suggests that firms to some extent get around the Medicaid CPI constraint -which aims to restrain the growth rate of pharmaceutical spending -by introducing new and more expensive versions of their drugs.
VI. Discussion
The first set of results summarized in this paper demonstrate that prescription drugs sold differentially to low-income Medicaid recipients have significantly higher prices than do otherwise similar drugs. Because the Medicaid price is based on prices paid in the U.S. private sector, firms have a strong incentive to charge private patients more for their drugs than they otherwise would. To the extent this happens, some private patients who would otherwise purchase these drugs are priced out of the market. Our second set of findings, that Medicaid's CPI constraint creates additional product proliferation beyond what would exist in the absence of this constraint, is somewhat more subtle. The regulation only limits price increases for existing products, so a firm can introduce a new product to obtain freedom to raise prices. Because of the fixed cost of introducing a new version, this strategy is only attractive for drugs with large sales to Medicaid and drugs expected to continue to have large sales to Medicaid. Our evidence indicates that the manufacturers of these drugs find the benefit of a new version outweighs the fixed cost required; our data show that these drugs proliferate more new NDCs than would otherwise be expected during our study period.
The combination of these two findings leads us to conclude that the Medicaid procurement regulations distort market outcomes. Government involvement in the private market -simply through the government's own pricing rules -causes change in the equilibrium prices faced by private consumers. We suspect our findings capture the unintended consequences of policy made with good intentions. Policy makers might be averse to setting an absolute price for procurement because it is difficult to get that right and price has both important distributional consequences and substantial effects on innovation incentives. So linking the government price to the private sector price seems like a good idea.
But an important cost of doing this is the effect on private sector prices. Medicaid's price-setting rules may substantially lower allocative efficiency for certain drug treatments, as some low valuation Medicaid recipients take the drug while other high-valuation consumers without Medicaid coverage do not. Even without this efficiency effect, non-Medicaid consumers may purchase health insurance or try to become eligible for Medicaid to reduce their medical expenditure, thus leading to further increases in prices.
We conjecture that our findings may partially explain why certain drugs are so expensive. Thus likely our 18.5% Medicaid market share is lower than the total share of the market that is sold under the Medicaid regulations. We do not have the data to measure drug-specific expenditures by these other programs. As long as they are not both large and disproportionately 34 The market share for HIV/AIDS drugs increases to almost 65% if one includes ADAP expenditures, which use Medicaid prices. 35 Aldridge and Doyle (2002) purchasing non-Medicaid drugs, then Medicaid share remains a good proxy for the size of purchases under Medicaid rules.
Our results take on additional policy significance when one considers that government involvement in this sector will soon expand by a great deal due to the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. As the proportion of insured patients increases and inelastic government purchases make up an even greater share of the market, there is cause for concern that prices may rise substantially, to some extent offsetting the benefit to Medicare recipients and harming other health care consumers as well.
Many have argued that U.S. pays too much for prescription drugs; this feedback from public to private may partially explain why pharmaceutical prices in the US are relatively high.
While any method of procurement has its problems, in our view, up to this point policy makers
have not focused sufficient attention on the effect that linking public and private markets has on the prices paid by consumers in the private sector. Whether our results generalize to other categories of health care or to other types of government procurement represent important topics for future research. Price Rank ***, **, and * represent significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Specifications include the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-counter and generic) in 1997 based on total sales from IMS. The dependent variable in specifications one through four is the log of the average price per prescription. Each specification includes 14 therapeutic class fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Specifications include the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-counter and generic) in 1997 based on total sales from IMS. The dependent variable in specifications one through four is the price rank for each drug (200 is most and 1 is least expensive). Each specification includes 14 therapeutic class fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(1) Specifications include NDCs for the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-counter and generic) in 1997 based on total sales from IMS. The dependent variable in specifications one and two is the log of the average price per prescription while in three and four it is the log of the average price per unit. The first two specifications include 200 drug fixed effects while the last two include 287 drug-route fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Specifications include NDCs for the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-counter and generic) in 2002 based on total sales from IMS. The dependent variable in specifications one and two is the log of the average price per prescription while in three and four it is the log of the average price per unit. The first two specifications include 200 drug fixed effects while the last two include 279 drug-route fixed effects. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(1) 
